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FOR MANY YEARS, one of my primary areas of practice hasbeen defending aviation-related claims. At times, I have been
directly engaged by a defendant who is self-insured, but more
often, I am retained by insurers to defend their insureds. Over
the years, in the context of my non-aviation work, I have also
litigated fairly in-depth insurance coverage matters on behalf of
insurers. My coverage work has expanded my perspective on
what insurance issues might come into play during the prosecu-
tion or defense of an aviation case and given me a unique per-
spective on what aviation practitioners should be cognizant of as
they navigate through an aviation lawsuit (or any type of claim
involving insurance).
There are excellent in-depth treatises1 on aviation insurance,
as well as articles about discrete policy provisions but no general
summary of what insurance issues the aviation practitioner
might encounter. This article is intended to fill that gap and
provide a general overview of some common aviation coverage
issues.
II. THE UNIQUE AVIATION INSURANCE MARKET
The risks insured in the aviation insurance market are varied,
but some common types of policies and coverage include air-
craft manufacturer insurance, air cargo insurance, air charter
* Pam Hicks represents commercial air carriers, general aviation interests,
shippers, fixed base operators, airports, and aircraft component part
manufacturers in accident litigation, product liabilty, commercial, and cargo
claims at both the trial and appellate level. She is a founding shareholder of
Hicks Davis Wynn, P.C. The views expressed in this article are those of the author
and not of the firm or the firm’s clients.
1 For a detailed text on aviation insurance coverage, see ROD D. MARGO ET AL.,
MARGO ON AVIATION INSURANCE (4th ed. 2014).
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insurance, aerobatic or experimental aircraft insurance, airline
insurance, airport or ground handler insurance, crew insurance,
lender insurance, fixed base operator insurance, flight training
insurance, general aviation pleasure and business insurance,
hanger-keepers’ liability, rotorcraft insurance, space or satellite
insurance, and unmanned aircraft systems insurance.
While general aviation risks and ground-based operations in-
volve some of the same considerations as insurance coverage in
other industries, the insurance provided to airliners is a dis-
tinctly unique market. In traditional markets, premiums are col-
lected from large volumes of insureds, providing capital to pay
for a few losses and earning the insurer a reasonable profit over
time. However, “[t]he aviation insurance market has always dif-
fered from most other insurance markets in that both the pre-
mium base and the customer base are very narrow, with just a
small number of insureds.”2 The International Air Transport As-
sociation (IATA) has about 230 members, a very small number
of potential insured, each with potentially huge exposures.3 A
single insurer will not usually underwrite the entire amount of
an airline’s overall risk. Instead, “a number of insurers will each
underwrite a small percentage of that exposure, thus keeping
the exposure for any one insurer within acceptable limits.”4 A
recent case discussed such a pool of aviation insurers and the
right of the managing agent of the pool to pursue the rights of
the entire group.5
III. THE INSURANCE POLICY AND THE
INSURER’S DUTIES
The components of an aviation insurance policy are generally
the same as those of other insurance lines, but the specific ex-
clusions and endorsements are unique to the aviation risk.
In general, a policy is comprised of declarations, the insuring
agreement, warranties, exclusions, and endorsements. Some
policies expressly incorporate documents outside of the policy,
such as the application for insurance, and make them a part of





5 See Glob. Aerospace, Inc. v. Platinum Jet Mgmt., LLC, 488 F. App’x 338, 340
(11th Cir. 2012) (discussing the standing a managing general agent has to bring
claims on behalf of the insurance pool for policy breaches by insureds).
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the insurance contract. Binders, which are temporary, prelimi-
nary contracts of insurance, might be the operative insurance
contract if an occurrence resulting in a loss takes place before a
policy has incepted or between policy periods.6
A. DUTIES TO DEFEND AND INDEMNIFY
When a lawsuit is filed, an insured’s first step should be to
place all insurance carriers on notice of the claim (or potential
claim). An insurer then acknowledges the claim and makes a
decision as to whether there is coverage, sometimes with the as-
sistance of coverage counsel. The insurer generally has two dis-
tinct and separate duties to its insured: the duty to defend,
which requires the retention and payment of defense counsel,
and the duty to indemnify, which requires the payment of a
judgment for a covered claim.7 An insurer’s duty to defend is
broader than its duty to indemnify.8 Tests for determining
whether a duty to defend or indemnify is triggered vary by state
and involve fact specific and nuanced inquiries.9
In Louisiana, Texas, and many other states, whether an in-
surer has a duty to defend is determined solely by comparing
the allegations against the insured in the complaint with the
terms of the policy at issue—the so-called “eight corners” (some-
times “four corners”) rule.10 “If a petition does not allege facts
within the scope of coverage, an insurer is not legally required
to defend a suit against its insured.”11 However, if there are any
facts in the complaint that, if taken as true, support a claim for
which coverage is not unambiguously excluded, the insurer
must defend the insured.12 “Assuming all the allegations of the
6 See, e.g., Glob. Aerospace, Inc. v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. Ins. Brokers of
Cal., Inc., No. S-06-594 LKK/KJM, 2007 WL 1695102, at *6 (E.D. Cal. June 8,
2007).
7 See Am. All. Ins. Co. v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 788 S.W.2d 152, 153 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 1990, writ dism’d).
8 Selective Ins. Co. of Se. v. J.B. Mouton & Sons, Inc., 954 F.2d 1075, 1077 (5th
Cir. 1992) (applying Louisiana law).
9 For a recent analysis of whether an aviation insurer had a duty to defend, see
City of Glendale v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, No. CV-12-380-PHX-
BSB, 2013 WL 1296418 (D. Ariz. Mar. 29, 2013).
10 See Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Smith, 243 F. Supp. 2d 576, 580 (E.D. La. 2003) (apply-
ing Louisiana law); see also Am. Physicians Ins. Exch. v. Garcia, 876 S.W.2d 842,
847–48 (Tex. 1994).
11 Garcia, 876 S.W.2d at 848.
12 In re Complaint of Stone Petroleum Corp., 961 F.2d 90, 91 (5th Cir. 1992)
(applying Louisiana law); Me. Bonding & Cas. Co. v. Douglas Dynamics, Inc., 594
A.2d 1079, 1081 (Me. 1991) (noting that under Maine law, the insurer must de-
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petition are true, the insurer must defend, regardless of the out-
come of the suit, if there would be both (1) coverage under the
policy and (2) liability to the plaintiff.”13
However, a number of other jurisdictions permit extrinsic evi-
dence to be considered when determining if there is a duty to
defend. In other words, the court will go beyond the eight cor-
ners of the policy and complaint to examine the “true facts” to
determine the duty to defend.14 For example, in Iowa, the
“[s]cope of inquiry [for the duty to defend] . . . [includes] the
pleadings of the injured party and any other admissible and rel-
evant facts in the record.”15
The duty to indemnify is generally narrower than the duty to
defend.16 This duty is triggered by the actual facts establishing
liability in the underlying suit.17 In the aviation context, the di-
chotomy between the broader duty to defend and the more lim-
ited duty to indemnify is illustrated in Oxford Aviation, Inc. v.
fend so long as the claims in the complaint create even a remote possibility of
coverage).
13 Hardy v. Hartford Ins. Co., 236 F.3d 287, 290 (5th Cir. 2001) (applying Loui-
siana law).
14 One commentator has stated that as many as thirty-five states allow the con-
sideration of some form of extrinsic evidence to ascertain whether there is a duty
to defend. See Randy J. Maniloff, The “True Facts” Exception To The Four Corners-Duty




15 Id. (citing Talen v. Emp’rs Mut. Cas. Co., 703 N.W.2d 395, 406 (Iowa 2005));
see Am. Bumper & Mfg. Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 550 N.W.2d 475, 481 (Mich.
1996) (“The insurer has the duty to look behind the third party’s allegations to
analyze whether coverage is possible.”); Garvis v. Emp’rs Mut. Cas. Co., 497
N.W.2d 254, 258 (Minn. 1993) (stating that the determination of the duty to
defend includes consideration of facts of which the insurer is “aware”); Farmland
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Scruggs, 886 So. 2d 714, 719 n.2 (Miss. 2004) (holding that in
determining whether an insurer has a duty to defend, an insurer may consider
those “true facts [that] are inconsistent with the complaint” brought to the in-
surer’s attention by the insured); Peterson v. Ohio Cas. Grp., 724 N.W.2d 765,
773–74 (Neb. 2006) (finding that a duty to defend exists where the “actual facts”
reveal such a duty exists); Am. Gen. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Co., 799
P.2d 1113, 1116 (N.M. 1990) (“The duty of an insurer to defend arises from the
allegations on the face of the complaint or from the known but unpleaded fac-
tual basis of the claim . . . .”); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Harbert, 741 N.W.2d
228, 234 (S.D. 2007) (“[T]he issue of whether an insurer has a duty to defend is
determined by . . . ‘other evidence of record.’”).
16 But see D.R. Horton-Tex., Ltd. v. Markel Int’l Ins. Co., Ltd., 300 S.W.3d 740,
741 (Tex. 2009).
17 Heyden Newport Chem. Corp. v. S. Gen. Ins. Co., 387 S.W.2d 22, 25 (Tex.
1965).
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Global Aerospace, Inc.18 In the underlying suit, a customer sued a
repair station for breach of contract, breach of warranty, and
other Maine state law claims.19 The complaint alleged that “one
of the plane’s side windows cracked during the flight home
[from the repair station] due to Oxford’s ‘negligence and faulty
performance.’”20 The insuring agreement in Oxford’s Commer-
cial General Liability (CGL) policy stated that it applied to
claims for “bodily injury or property damage . . . resulting from
your aviation operations” but applied “only if the injury or dam-
age ‘is caused by an occurrence and takes place in the coverage
territory.’”21 Property damage was defined to include
“[p]hysical injury to tangible property, including all resulting
loss of use of that property,” and an occurrence was defined as
“an accident . . . .”22 The CGL policy’s exclusions included sev-
eral “business risk” exclusions, which were intended to leave cov-
erage for faulty work to other policies, such as professional
liability policies.23
Oxford asked the insurer to defend the lawsuit filed by its cus-
tomer.24 The insurer disclaimed both coverage and a duty to de-
fend.25 A declaratory judgement action followed.26 Stretching
the allegations in the complaint to their extreme, the court de-
termined that the cracked window could have been a “‘particu-
lar part’ of property ‘on’ which Oxford performed work”
because an invoice attached to the complaint mentioned the use
of Proseal® on a window that was not furnished or installed by
Oxford.27
The court recognized that if the customer proved its case
against Oxford:
It seems unlikely that there will be much, if any, indemnification
since most of the claimed injuries appear likely to be covered by
exclusions. But the duty to defend is triggered by any realistic
possibility of any damage that might be within coverage and
18 680 F.3d 85 (1st Cir. 2012).
19 Id. at 86–87.
20 Id. at 87.
21 Id. at 88.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 89.
24 Id. at 87.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 90.
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outside the exclusions and the damaged window creates that
prospect.28
Thus, the court held that the insurer had a duty to defend Ox-
ford.29 However, the court handily rejected Oxford’s bad faith
claim against the insurer because the “potential for coverage
here is a close call” requiring a “close parsing to preserve the
possibility” of the duty to defend.30
Another recent case discussing the scope of coverage in avia-
tion related policies is XL Specialty Insurance Co. v. Progressive Cas-
ualty Insurance Co.,31 decided by the Ninth Circuit. At issue was
whether a “policy provid[ing] coverage for any accident ‘arising
out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the aircraft’” was
triggered when a fuel truck was involved in a fatal accident with
a passenger vehicle while en route to refuel the helicopter.32 Ap-
plying Montana law, the court determined that although the he-
licopter was “not involved in the accident itself, [it] was ‘a prime
accessory, without which the injury-producing incident’ . . .
would not have occurred.”33 However, the court found that the
helicopter’s insurer had no obligation to make an equitable
contribution toward a settlement because the claim had not
been tendered from the insured to the insurer.34
IV. THE FORTUITY REQUIREMENT
Since the very basis of insurance is to protect against acciden-
tal losses rather than intentional acts or breaches of contract, it
should be axiomatic that an insurance policy cannot cover losses
that are not fortuitous. Losses that the insured knew about, or
should have known about, at the time it purchased a policy are
not covered.35 These concepts are generally known as the fortu-
ity doctrine, the loss in progress, or the known-loss rule.36
28 Id. at 92.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 411 F. App’x 78 (9th Cir. 2011).
32 Id. at 80.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 81; cf. Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Prof’l. Aircraft Line Serv., 776 F.3d 575, 582
(8th Cir. 2015) (holding that the airline’s notice of suit to the insurer of the
maintenance company whose actions were responsible for the claim was suffi-
cient to place the carrier on notice of a claim).
35 Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Travis, 68 S.W.3d 72, 75 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, pet.
denied).
36 Chu v. Canadian Indem. Co., 274 Cal. Rptr. 20, 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)
(“The concept of ‘fortuity’ is basic to insurance law. . . . Insurance protects
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As explained by the Texas Supreme Court, “it is contrary to
public policy for an insurance company, the business of which is
affected with a public interest, knowingly to assume the burden
of a loss that occurred prior to making the contract”; accord-
ingly, “an agent has no authority to issue a policy to cover a
known loss.”37 A “known loss” is “a loss the insured knew had
occurred prior to making the insurance contract.”38 A “‘loss in
progress’ occurs when the insured is, or should be, aware of an
ongoing progressive loss at the time the policy is purchased.”39
Under the doctrine, “[i]nsurance coverage is precluded where
the insured is or should be aware of an ongoing progressive or
known loss at the time the policy is purchased”—not at the time
of the retroactive date in the policy.40 When there are many in-
sureds, at least one court has held that fortuity is to be evaluated
from the insured’s joint perspective, such that if one insured
knows of a loss, all insureds are precluded from obtaining in-
demnity under the policy.41
Notably, application of the doctrine “does not hinge on
whether the insured knew a particular act was wrongful. Rather,
it hinges on whether the insured knew before the inception of
coverage that an act—knowingly wrongful or otherwise—re-
against risks of loss, not certainties of loss.”); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Gulf Ins. Co., 901
S.W.2d 495, 501 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ) (explaining
that the fortuity doctrine negates a duty to defend or indemnify “where the in-
sured is, or should be, aware of an ongoing progressive loss or known loss at the
time the policy is purchased”); see RLI Ins. Co. v. Maxxon Sw., Inc., 265 F. Supp.
2d 727, 730 (N.D. Tex. 2003), aff’d sub nom., 108 F. App’x 194 (5th Cir. 2004).
37 Burch v. Commonwealth Cty. Mut. Ins. Co., 450 S.W.2d 838, 840–41 (Tex.
1970); see Two Pesos, 901 S.W.2d at 501–02 (noting that “Texas has long recog-
nized that it is contrary to public policy for an insurance company knowingly to
assume a loss occurring prior to its contract” because “[g]enerally, fortuity is an
inherent requirement of all risk insurance policies”); see also Mason Drug Co.,
Inc. v. Harris, 597 F.2d 886, 887 (5th Cir. 1979) (recognizing the “‘loss-in-pro-
gress’ principle” as “standard insurance law”).
38 Scottsdale, 68 S.W.3d at 75.
39 Id.
40 Id.; see Burch, 450 S.W.2d at 840–41 (noting that “recovery may be had on a
policy antedated to include the time at which a loss occurred provided neither
the applicant nor the insurer knew of the loss when the contract was made”); see
also Great Sw. Fire Ins. Co. v. Watt Indus., Inc., 280 Cal. Rptr. 249, 255 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1991) (noting that “[a]s long as the insured has no knowledge of a potential
claim at the time the policy is purchased, no argument can be made that the risk
cannot be insured against”).
41 Fleet Bus. Credit, L.L.C. v. Glob. Aerospace Underwriting Managers Ltd.,
646 F. Supp. 2d 473, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (relying on Cross Liability Provision
that specifically exempted the hull and spare parts coverage at issue in the
lawsuit).
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sulted in a loss.”42 Accordingly, the “loss” triggering the doctrine
takes places when the injury occurred—not when a court later
adjudicates damages resulting from that injury.43
Courts in California recognize fortuity as a “basic insurance
concept” because “[i]nsurance protects against risks of [l]oss,
not certainties of loss.”44 The California legislature codified the
concept of fortuity in the state insurance code. Section 22 of the
state insurance code states that “[i]nsurance is a contract
whereby one undertakes to indemnify another against loss, dam-
age, or liability arising from a contingent or unknown event.”45
Section 3517 of the state civil code further recognizes that “no
one can take advantage of his own wrong.”46 Accordingly, courts
in California have found that it is “contrary to public policy to
permit a wrongdoer . . . to retain the benefit of defense costs . . .
to defend against a known injury.”47 Thus, a plaintiff seeking
insurance coverage for a loss must show that the claimed loss
was fortuitous.48
Under New York law, a “fortuitous event” means “any occur-
rence or failure to occur which is, or is assumed by the parties to
be, to a substantial extent beyond the control of either party.”49
The burden of proof is on the insured to prove that a loss is
fortuitous and within coverage.50
In Fleet Business Credit v. Global Aerospace Underwriting Managers,
the Southern District of New York (and on appeal, the Second
Circuit) considered the fortuity doctrine in the context of an
42 Warrantech Corp. v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 210 S.W.3d 760, 768 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied); see Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Emp’rs Ins.
of Wausau, No. 847212, 1995 WL 870851, at *14 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 26, 1995)
(“California courts have applied the ‘known loss’ rule to deny coverage for dam-
ages to third parties where the insured knew of the damage prior to the incep-
tion of the insurance policy”).
43 Franklin v. Fugro-McClelland (Sw.), Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 732, 736 (S.D. Tex.
1997).
44 Upper Deck Co. v. Endurance Am. Specialty Ins. Co., No. 10CV1032
JM(WMC), 2011 WL 6396413, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2011) (citing Chu v. Cana-
dian Indem. Co., 274 Cal. Rptr. 20, 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)).
45 CAL. INS. CODE § 22 (West 2016).
46 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3517 (West 2016).
47 Upper Deck, 2011 WL 6396413, at *7.
48 Fleet Bus. Credit, L.L.C. v. Glob. Aerospace Underwriting Managers Ltd.,
812 F. Supp. 2d 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d sub nom., Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P.
v. Glob. Aerospace Underwriting Managers Ltd., 488 F. App’x 473 (2d Cir. 2012)
(applying New York law).
49 N.Y. INS. LAW § 1101(a)(2) (McKinney 2015).
50 In re Balfour MacLaine Int’l. Ltd., 85 F.3d 68, 77–78 (2d. Cir. 1996) (cita-
tions omitted).
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“all risk” policy covering aircraft and engine parts.51 The insured
airline was cash strapped and “spiral[ing] toward bankruptcy” at
the time of the loss.52 Unable to pay repair bills or obtain credit,
the airline had no inventory of spare parts.53 To keep some of its
aircraft operational, several parts had been stripped from the
insured aircraft to be used on other aircraft in the fleet.54 Even-
tually, a bankruptcy trustee put an end to the scavenging, but
not before a Boeing 747-100 airframe and two Pratt & Whitney
JT9 engines went missing.55 The financing companies, who were
insured under the policy, made a claim for the lost equipment
to the insurer.56 The insurer declined to provide coverage for
the robbed parts, and the insured filed suit.57
Evidence presented at trial established that the airline “had a
history of reliance on a process known as ‘robbing’ in which it
removed operational parts from aircraft on the ground for use
in other aircraft.”58 The court noted that the creditors of the
airline were “well aware of [its] practice of robbing,” even com-
plaining of the practice to the Bankruptcy Court.59 The court
held that the intentional misconduct of the insured airline was
not fortuitous, and precluded coverage for the co-insured
lenders.60
On appeal, the Second Circuit focused on the creditors’ argu-
ment that they were “innocent coinsured[s]” and that they “rea-
sonably expected that their interests in the property were
covered by the policy despite the independent misconduct of
their coinsured” airline.61 Recognizing that the parties to the in-
surance contract could vary the application of the innocent co-
insured doctrine by the language of the policy, the court
affirmed, finding that the “policy covered only those losses that
were accidental from the perspective of all insureds, which the
claimed losses were not.”62
51 Fleet Bus. Credit, 812 F. Supp. 2d at 354–55.
52 Highland Capital Mgmt., 488 Fed. App’x at 475.
53 Fleet Bus. Credit, 812 F. Supp. 2d at 348.
54 Id. at 347–48.
55 Id. at 344–47.
56 Id. at 344.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 347.
59 Id. at 349.
60 Id. at 357.
61 Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P. v. Glob. Aerospace Underwriting Managers
Ltd., 488 F. App’x 473, 475 (2d Cir. 2012).
62 Id. at 476.
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V. INSURING FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Whether insurance covers awards of punitive or exemplary
damages varies both by the language in each insurance policy
and by the applicable state law. In Fairfield Insurance Co. v. Ste-
phens Martin Paving, LP,63 the Texas Supreme Court responded
to a certified question from the Fifth Circuit as to whether
“Texas public policy prohibit[s] a liability insurance provider
from indemnifying an award for punitive damages imposed on
its insured because of gross negligence?”64 The court held that
“[t]he Legislature’s expressed intent is that Texas public policy
does not prohibit insurance coverage for claims of gross negli-
gence in this context.”65 Importantly, the insurance policy at is-
sue was a worker’s compensation policy, and the court
secondarily held that “the public policy of Texas does not pro-
hibit insurance coverage of exemplary damages for gross negli-
gence in the workers’ compensation context.”66 The court in Fairfield
did not discuss the word “accident” or its definition under Texas
law but interpreted Texas public policy. Thus, outside of the
workers’ compensation context, the question remains an open
one under Texas law.67
Fairfield is helpful for providing guidance as to the insurability
of punitive damages outside of Texas because, in its opinion, the
Texas Supreme Court discussed the issue of whether insuring
for punitive damages is against public policy in nearly every
state.68 Twenty-five states have generally determined that public
policy does not prohibit insurance coverage for punitive dam-
ages, eight states prohibit coverage for such damages, seven per-
mit coverage, but only when the insured’s liability is vicarious,
and three states permit coverage in the context of uninsured
motorists.69 In contrast, two states prohibit such coverage.70
Thus, a good starting point for answering the questions of
63 246 S.W.3d 653 (Tex. 2008).
64 Id. at 654.
65 Id. at 660.
66 Id. at 670 (emphasis added).
67 See Liberty Ins. Corp. v. Dixie Elec., LLC., 101 F. Supp. 3d 575, 583 (N.D.
Tex. 2015), aff’d sub nom., No. 15-10279, 2015 WL 9145494 (5th Cir. Dec. 16,
2015).
68 The court noted that Nebraska prohibits the imposition of punitive dam-
ages. Fairfield Ins. Co., 246 S.W.3d at 660–62.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 661–62.
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whether punitive damages are insurable is to review the Texas
Supreme Court’s discussion in Fairfield.71
VI. LOSS-PAYEE CLAUSES
A loss-payee clause generally provides that the proceeds of an
insurance policy are to be first paid to a designated loss-payee
(typically a lender) rather than to the named insured. If the loss-
payee clause is “open” or “simple” it provides that, if an insured
loss occurs, the proceeds first go to the lender.72 The lender’s
rights are no greater than those of the named insured.73 In con-
trast, a “standard” or “union” loss-payee clause results in addi-
tional separate obligations owed to the lender.74 If the policy
does not provide coverage because of the named insured’s ac-
tions or neglect, the lender is protected.75
In Union Planters National Bank v. American Home Assurance, the
named insured cancelled coverage for one of many aircraft in-
sured under the policy.76 Later, that aircraft was seized by the
U.S. government as an instrument of drug trafficking.77 The
loss-payee endorsement provided that the lender was entitled to
thirty days’ notice prior to cancellation of the policy and also
stated that the insurance would not be invalidated by any act of
the named insured or change in ownership of the aircraft ex-
cept the “conversion, embezzlement[,] or secretion” of the
named insured.78 The lender was not provided notice that the
71 Id. at 688 (Hecht, J., concurring) (summarizing, “Finally, though Texas’[s]
public policy is its own, it is formed[ ] not in a vacuum, but in awareness of the
law of other American jurisdictions. That law is, of course, heavily influenced by
the jurisdiction’s view of punitive damages. The cases defy easy categorization,
but it appears that: [nineteen] states generally permit coverage of punitive dam-
ages; [eight] states would permit coverage of punitive damages for grossly negli-
gent conduct, but not for more serious conduct; [eleven] states would permit
coverage of punitive damages for vicariously-assessed liability, but not directly-
assessed liability; [seven] states generally prohibit an insured from indemnifying
himself against punitive damages; and the remainder have silent, unclear, or oth-
erwise inapplicable law. States may fall into more than one category.” (footnotes
omitted)).
72 Union Planters Nat. Bank v. Am. Home Assurance Co., No. W2001-01124-
COA-R3-C, 2002 WL 1308344, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2002).
73 Id. at *4; see STEVEN PLITT ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE § 65:32 (3d ed.
1995).
74 Union Planters, 2002 WL 1308344, at *4.
75 Id.
76 Id. at *2.
77 Id.
78 Id. at *5.
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insurance coverage for the seized aircraft had been cancelled
for more than three months after cancellation.79
The lender sought coverage under the loss-payee endorse-
ment. The insurer argued that the thirty days’ notice provision
applied only in the event the entire policy was cancelled.80 Since
other aircraft were still insured, it was inapplicable.81 The court
disagreed, noting the purpose of the notice provision was to per-
mit insureds to obtain alternate coverage in the event of a can-
cellation, and found the insurer’s interpretation of the notice
provision to be unreasonable.82
The court also found that the owner’s failure to keep the air-
craft hangered and to operate it in a manner consistent with the
insurance policy, which were breaches of the warranty provi-
sions of the policy, did not impact the lender’s rights to cover-
age unless the bank knew of the breaches.83
In St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Luke Ready Air, LLC,84 the
owner of a King Air 200 was “conned . . . into turning over the
Aircraft” to an individual representing himself as an agent of the
government of Guadalajara, Mexico. The “agent” presented the
owner with a “Licitation Order” and wired $100,000 to a broker
representing the owner.85 Believing, incorrectly, that the re-
mainder of the aircraft’s purchase price would be wired to him,
the aircraft was turned over to the “agent.”86 The broker never
received the balance of the purchase price, and the “agent” dis-
appeared, along with the King Air.87 The owner’s lender was
named as a loss-payee on the aircraft insurance policy.88 Both
the lender and the aircraft owner made a claim for the loss
under the policy.89
The policy contained the following exclusion: “We will not
make pay for the loss or damage caused by or resulting from any
of the following: . . . Wrongful ‘conversion’ . . . of the ‘covered
aircraft.’ . . . Voluntary parting with any property by you or any-
79 Id. at *2.
80 Id. at *5.
81 Id.
82 Id. at *6.
83 Id. at *7.
84 880 F. Supp. 2d 1299 (S.D. Fla. 2012).
85 Id. at 1302–03.
86 Id. at 1302.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 1303.
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one else to whom you have entrusted the property if induced to
do so by any fraudulent scheme, device or false pretense.”90
The policy also contained the following endorsement:
b.  Coverage under the Finance Endorsement
The Finance Endorsement, amongst other things, adds the fol-
lowing condition to the Aircraft policy:
The coverage provided by this policy to [Legacy Bank] will not
be invalidated by any act or omission of any other person or or-
ganization [that] results in a breach of any term or condition of
this policy, provided that [Legacy Bank] has not caused, contrib-
uted to, or knowingly condoned[ ] the act or omission.91
The lender argued that the endorsement should be read to
preclude the application of the exclusions to its claims.92 The
court disagreed, acknowledging that while the bank’s claims do
not depend on whether the aircraft owner’s loss was covered,
the loss still must be within the policy’s coverage and not subject
to exclusions.93
VII. CHOICE OF LAW
In the event of a dispute between insured and insurer, which
law is applicable to the dispute? Traditionally, aviation insurance
policies did not include choice of law provisions.94 When a pol-
icy is silent, what law controls how the insurance contract is in-
terpreted? Texas and a number of other states apply the “most
significant relationship” test from the Restatement (Second) of
Conflicts when deciding choice of law questions.95 Section 6 lists
these general factors for a court to consider:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the rel-
ative interests of those states in the determination of the
particular issue,
90 Id. at 1307.
91 Id. at 1308 (alteration in original).
92 Id. at 1309.
93 Id.
94 At least one commentator has observed that there is a trend to include
choice of law and forum selection clauses in commercial aviation policies. See
Katherine B. Posner, The Unique Role of Aviation Insurance Counsel, ASPATORE, at *2
(2011), 2011 WL 970668.
95 See Pennzoil-Quaker State Co. v. Am. Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co., 653 F.
Supp. 2d 690, 702 (S.D. Tex. 2009).
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(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to
be applied.96
When determining a breach of contract dispute, Section 188
lists additional factors for a court to consider:
(a) the place of contracting,
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract,
(c) the place of performance,
(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and
(e) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorpora-
tion and place of business of the parties.97
The relevant inquiry in a case involving the construction and
application of an insurance policy is the contact between the
state and the insurance dispute—not the underlying litigation.98
Courts evaluate the contacts based on their relative importance
to the particular issue, and they assign them varying weights to
protect the expectations of the parties.99
Assume that an insurer is a Delaware corporation with its prin-
cipal place of business in Massachusetts and that it issued a pol-
icy to a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business
in California to cover claims brought against the insured within
the United States and elsewhere in the world.
A court following the Restatement’s choice of law analysis
would likely give the place of contracting and negotiation
greater weight if the evidence shows that both occurred in Cali-
fornia. The place of contracting is the place where “the last act
necessary to give the contract binding effect” occurred.100 If the
evidence shows that the policy was contracted, negotiated, and
delivered to the insured in California, a Texas court would likely
apply California law to protect the “justified expectations” of the
parties and to foster “certainty, predictability and uniformity of
96 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
97 Id. § 188(2). Article 21.42 of the Texas Insurance Code contains a statutory
choice-of-law directive for insurance disputes, but is applicable only when the
insureds seeking defense and indemnity are “citizen[s]” or “inhabitant[s]” of
Texas. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.42 (West 2015).
98 Pennzoil-Quaker, 653 F. Supp. 2d at 702–03.
99 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188(2) cmt. b (AM. LAW
INST. 1971).
100 Id. § 188(2) cmt. e.
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result” pursuant to the principles of Section 6.101 For instance,
one Texas court applied Mississippi law to a dispute, even
though the majority of the insured property was located in
Texas, because the policy had been contracted and largely nego-
tiated in Mississippi, it had been delivered in Mississippi, and
premiums had been paid out of a business office in Missis-
sippi.102 However, if the evidence shows that the parties con-
tracted and negotiated from offices in different states, a court
will likely give those factors little weight.103
A court deciding a choice of law issue in a policy covering
commercial aviation risks would likely give the place of perform-
ance and the subject matter of the contract little weight, if any,
because the policy provided national coverage in every state.
The place of performance and the location of the subject matter
of the contract are determinative only when insurance policies
cover a localized risk.104 Instead, where, as in the aviation con-
text, the policy covers risks located in multiple states, the loca-
tion of the risk is insignificant.105
Accordingly, the residence of the insured would likely be-
come the determinative factor in the choice of law analysis. As
explained by one court, “the most logical way to meet the par-
ties’ justified expectations when a policy covers property in mul-
tiple states is to apply the law of the insured’s state of
incorporation or principal place of business.”106
In contrast, when the risk insured is for a general aviation air-
craft, operated primarily in a single state, a court might give
more weight to where the insured property is located. For exam-
101 See, e.g., TV-3, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 28 F. Supp. 2d 407, 415 (E.D.
Tex. 1998).
102 Id. at 419–20.
103 See Sonat Expl. Co. v. Cudd Pressure Control, Inc., 271 S.W.3d 228, 233
(Tex. 2008) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188(2) cmt. e
(AM. LAW INST. 1971) (“[s]tanding alone, the place of contracting is a relatively
insignificant contact. . . . [and t]he place where the parties negotiate . . . is of less
importance when there is no one single place of negotiation and agreement”)).
104 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 193 cmt. b (AM. LAW
INST. 1971).
105 See id. § 193 cmt. a (“There may be no principal location of the insured risk
. . . . In such a case, the location of the risk can play little role in the determina-
tion of the applicable law”); see, e.g., Fallon v. Superior Chaircraft Corp., 884 F.2d
229, 234 (5th Cir. 1989) (describing the application of the laws of multiple states
to a policy covering risks in multiple states as “an anomalous result [that] would
wreak havoc in the insurance industry”).
106 TV-3, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 421 n.23.
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ple, in Anderson v. Virginia Surety Co.,107 the court determined
that Maine law applied “because the insured risk, [the] airplane,
was located in Maine.” (“[I]t may be assumed that [the parties]
entered into the insurance contract with the expectation and
implied intent that the local law of the state where the risk is to
be located would be applied to determine issues that may arise
under the contract.”).108
VIII. INSURANCE AND DEFENSE COUNSEL
Most tort cases with an aviation component to them will in-
volve at least one insurance policy. If a suit triggers the insurer’s
duty to defend, defense counsel will be assigned to defend the
insured. Defense counsel must have a sufficient understanding
of the possible insurance issues involved to fulfill their obliga-
tions to defend their client.
A. DETERMINE WHAT INSURANCE MIGHT BE AVAILABLE
From the outset, counsel should be aware of what potential
insurance coverage there is for a particular claim. There might
be additional or excess coverage from a policy other than the
primary aviation policy. Additional insurance might be in the
form of another policy issued with the client as the named in-
sured (e.g., a Commercial General Liability Policy) or as a result
of a contractual obligation to defend or indemnify (e.g., a
purchase and sale agreement or a flight service agreement).
Knowing the full breadth of the client’s insurance program is
also essential for making appropriate disclosures during the
course of the lawsuit. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(a)(1)(A)(iv) requires a party to provide “any insurance
agreement under which an insurance business may be liable to
satisfy all or part of a possible judgment in the action or to in-
demnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judg-
ment.”109 Many state court discovery rules contain similar
requirements.110
107 985 F. Supp. 182 (D. Me. 1998).
108 Id. at 186 (quoting Baybutt Const. Corp. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 455
A.2d 914, 919 (Me. 1983), overruled by Peerless Ins. Co. v. Brennon, 564 A.2d 383
(Me. 1989)).
109 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iv).
110 See, e.g., TEX. R. CIV. P. 194.2(g) (mandating disclosure of any indemnity
and insuring agreements).
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B. CONFIRM IF THE DEFENSE IS SUBJECT TO A
RESERVATION OF RIGHTS
Whether the insured is being defended subject to a reserva-
tion of rights can have an effect on privilege issues. It also might
trigger the involvement of additional counsel. If an insurer is
defending under a reservation of rights, some states recognize
that a conflict of interest arises for the attorney appointed by the
insurer to defend, resulting in the right of an insured to hire
independent counsel at the insurer’s expense. Whether defend-
ing under a reservation of rights triggers the right to indepen-
dent counsel varies by state.111
Although defense counsel should be aware of and investigate
sources of insurance, it is not the role of defense counsel to
comment on matters of coverage. If there are coverage issues
that arise during the course of defending the suit, the insured,
insurer, or both should retain independent coverage counsel
for advice.
C. PROTECT PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS
There is no general privilege between insurance companies
and their insureds.112 Thus, counsel reporting to insurers should
be mindful of taking steps to protect those communications and
prevent them from becoming the target of discovery requests.
111 For a state by state survey of whether the insured has a right to independent
counsel at the insurer’s expense, see David B. Applefeld et. al., Independent Defense
Counsel: When Can The Policyholder Select Its Own Defense Lawyer and How Much Does




112 Linde Thompson Langworthy Kohn & Van Dyke, P.C. v. Resolution Trust
Corp., 5 F.3d 1508, 1514 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“Federal courts have never recognized
an insured-insurer privilege . . . .”); In re XL Specialty Ins. Co., 373 S.W.3d 46, 53
(Tex. 2012) (discussing Texas law); see Durkin v. Shields, 167 F.R.D. 447, 451
(S.D. Cal. 1995); c.f. Richard C. Giller, Confidentiality and Privilege in the In-
surer–Policyholder–Defense Counsel Relationship, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.ameri
canbar.org/litigation/committees/insurance/articles/marapr2012-confidential-
ity-privilege.html#_edn3 [https://perma.cc/DR2D-HLM9] (observing that three
states—Illinois, Indiana, and Missouri—recognize an insurer-insured privilege).
Note that a “federal court is not bound to recognize state privileges in federal
question cases.” Garrett v. City of San Francisco, 818 F.2d 1515, 1519 n.6 (9th Cir.
1987) (holding personnel files discoverable in federal civil rights action despite
claims of privilege under state law). Claims of privilege are determined under
federal law when an action involves both state and federal law claims. See Enns
Pontiac, Buick, & GMC Inc. v. Flores, No. CV-F-07-01043 LJO-BAM, 2011 WL
6181924, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2011).
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Importantly, the fact that there is no explicit protection for in-
sured and insurer communications does not mean that the com-
munications are not privileged. There are other privileges, such
as the attorney-client privilege, attorney work-product doctrine,
and common interest or joint defense doctrine,113 and “[t]he
absence of a general insurer–insured privilege does not pre-
clude the applicability of other recognized privileges that arise
in the course of the insurer–insured relationship.”114
If an unqualified defense is being provided, there is little dan-
ger that communications with the insurer could ever be discov-
ered as the interests of the insured and insurer are aligned.115
Consider the situation in which a defendant is being defended
subject to a reservation of rights, or when another party has
agreed to defend the client (e.g., through a contractual indem-
nity provision) even though the third party’s interests are al-
igned with the insured. Under those circumstances, the
communications to the insurer or third party indemnifier
should be carefully analyzed before disclosing privileged infor-
mation to the third party (the insurer or indemnifier). A policy
will typically have a cooperation clause, requiring the insured to
report to the insurer and cooperate in the defense. A typical
cooperation clause might provide:
c.  You and any other involved insured must:
(1) immediately send us copies of any demands notices sum-
monses or legal papers received in connection with the claim or
suit;
(2) Authorize us to obtain records and other information;
(3) Cooperate with us in the investigation or settlement of the
claim or defense against the suit; and
(4) Assist us, upon our request, in the enforcement of any right
against any person or organization which may be liable to the
113 See, e.g., N. River Ins. Co. v. Columbia Cas. Co., No. 90 Civ. 2518 (MJL),
1995 WL 5792, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 1995).
114 In re Tex. Health Res., 472 S.W.3d 895, 901 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, no
pet.).
115 See Sawyer v. Sw. Airlines, No. Civ.A.01-2385-KHV, 2002 WL 31928442, at *3
(D. Kan. Dec. 23, 2002) (discussing the application of the attorney client and
work-product privileges to communications between defense counsel retained by
an insurer and the claims attorney, and holding such communications were
privileged).
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insured because of injury or damage to which this insurance may
also apply.116
In Lectrolarm Custom Sys., Inc. v. Pelco Sales, Inc., the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of California, applying fed-
eral law, considered discovery requests intended to discover all
communications between an insurer (defending under a reser-
vation of rights) and its insured.117 The court recognized that
there was no general privilege applicable to insurer/insured
communications.118 However, when an insurance carrier is de-
fending the underlying lawsuit—even under a reservation of
rights—the insured and the insurer share a “common inter-
est.”119 Disclosures of privileged information between the two
would not waive an existing privilege.120 The court concluded
that due to their common interest, disclosure of privileged in-
formation by the insured to its insurer did not waive the attor-
ney client privilege or the work-product doctrine.121
IX. CONCLUSION
The outcome of an insurance coverage issue can often be de-
termined by actions that take place soon after the loss. Whether
notice of a claim is made promptly and correctly can be the dif-
ference between a loss that is covered by an insurance policy
and one that is not. Various procedural mechanisms, such as
pursuing early declartory judgments and selecting the proper
forum to resolve the dispute, can also be outcome determina-
tive. In the aviation insurance context, it is important to appreci-
ate these issues to obtain the best outcome for the client. While
this overview does not begin to address all of the insurance is-
sues that arise in this context, having a general understanding of
the insurer’s duties and common coverage issues in aviation pol-
icies should assist counsel in providing sound advice to clients.
116 See Lectrolarm Custom Sys., Inc. v. Pelco Sales, Inc., 212 F.R.D. 567, 568
(E.D. Cal. 2002).
117 Id. at 569–70.
118 Id. at 571.
119 Id. at 572.
120 Id.
121 Id.
